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Rights Adjudication in a Plurinational 
State: the Supreme Court of Canada, 
Freedom of Religion, and the Politics of 
Reasonable Accommodation
SUJIT CHOUDHRY *
A disproportionate number of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent cases on freedom of re-
ligion come out of Quebec and involve claims for reasonable accommodation. These decisions 
represent a point of national cleavage in two respects. First, in each case the Quebec Court 
of Appeal rejected the section 2(a) claims, and the Supreme Court of Canada overturned its 
decision. Second, the Supreme Court has often divided on national lines with one or more fran-
cophone judges from Quebec writing a concurrence or a sharp dissent. Moreover, francophone 
judges from outside Quebec have also broken ranks with their colleagues. The cleavages on the 
Supreme Court have sometimes tracked a large and arguably growing divide between Quebec 
and the rest of Canada on these questions. I link this line of cases to earlier disputes about 
the constitutionality of Quebec’s policies to promote the French language that were ultimately 
resolved by the Court. The fact that the Court spoke in a single voice in those earlier cases can 
be explained, in part, by the need to preserve its institutional legitimacy. This time, the point 
of dispute is not language, but religion. The Supreme Court is groping incrementally toward a 
kind of consensus position on the character of the “neutral” state to close this divide within the 
Court against the backdrop of an intense political debate on these issues in Quebec.
* Cecelia Goetz Professor of Law, NYU School of Law; Faculty Director, Center for 
Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law (see online: <http://www.constitutionaltransitions.
org>). An earlier version of this article was presented at the inaugural Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal Symposium, “Canada’s Rights Revolution: A Critical and Comparative Symposium on 
the Canadian Charter,” Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto (14 September 
2012). I thank Benjamin Berger, Jamie Cameron, Rosalind Dixon, Michael Ignatieff , Leslie 
Jacobs, Howard Kislowicz, Robert Leckey, Bruce Ryder, Colleen Sheppard, and Lorne Sossin. 
Cenobar Parker provided superb research assistance. All remaining errors are mine. 
 NB:  Th is article was completed prior to the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent decision 
in R v S(N), 2012 SCC 72, SCJ No 12. Th is case dealt with the question of reasonable 
accommodation in the context of criminal trials. As the appeal came from Ontario, it is not 
part of the line of cases I focus on here.
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Un nombre disproportionné des causes récentes de la Cour suprême du Canada sur la liberté 
de religion proviennent du Québec et font intervenir des demandes d’accommodements raison-
nables. Ces décisions représentent à deux égards un point de clivage national. Premièrement, 
dans toutes les causes, la Cour d’appel du Québec a rejeté les demandes en vertu de l’article 
2a) et la Cour suprême du Canada a renversé cette décision. Deuxièmement, la Cour suprême 
du Canada a souvent été divisée en raison de critères nationaux, alors qu’un ou plusieurs juges 
francophones du Québec rédigeaient un assentiment ou une dissidence marquée. De plus, 
des juges francophones de l’extérieur du Québec ont également rompu les rangs de leurs 
collègues. Les clivages de la Cour suprême dénotent parfois une grande division et, comme on 
pourrait en argumenter, une division croissante entre le Québec et le reste du Canada sur ces 
questions. Je relie cet ensemble de causes à des disputes antérieures sur la constitutionnalité 
des politiques du Québec visant à promouvoir la langue française, question qui a été résolue en 
dernier ressort par la Cour. Lors de ces causes antérieures, le fait que la Cour se soit exprimée 
à l’unisson peut s’expliquer en partie par le besoin de préserver sa légitimité institutionnelle. 
Cette fois ci, le point en litige n’est pas la langue, mais plutôt la religion. La Cour suprême se 
dirige à tâtons vers une position de plus en plus consensuelle sur le caractère « neutre » de 
l’état pour clore cette division de la Cour sur la toile de fond d’un débat politique intense sur 
ces questions au Québec.
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THE CHARTER’S1 GUARANTEE of freedom of religion has been both central and 
peripheral to Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. On the one hand, two of 
the earliest cases under the Charter arose under section 2(a)—Big M 2 and Edwards 
Books. 3 In addition to marking important occasions for the Supreme Court 
of Canada to assert its power of judicial review over a politically controversial 
legislative policy (Sunday closing laws), the Court used those judgments to set 
out some of the basic framework of Charter adjudication, such as the purposive 
approach to interpreting Charter guarantees4 and the idea that deference is 
warranted under section 1 in some circumstances.5 But for many years section 
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
2. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 SCR 295, 18 DLR (4th) 321 [Big M].
3. R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713, 35 DLR (4th) 1 [Edwards Books].
4. Big M, supra note 2.
5. Edwards Books, supra note 3.
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2(a) lay fallow, generating few appeals that made their way to the Supreme Court. 
Important doctrinal issues under section 2(a) remained unaddressed, and cases 
concerning religious freedom could not contribute to the development of the 
broader edifi ce of Charter doctrine—most notably, questions of evidence under 
section 1 and constitutional remedies.
Over the past decade, this picture has changed dramatically. In Lafontaine, 6 
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 7 Multani, 8 Bruker, 9 Hutterian Brethren, 10 AC,11 
and SL, 12 the Court added considerable detail to the constitutional doctrine 
surrounding section 2(a). Th e Court has now grappled with what constitutes a 
religion, the elements for making out a successful section 2(a) claim, and the 
requisite issues of evidence. 13 Th e Court has also squarely addressed the question 
of reasonable accommodation, adapting for the Charter an idea originally developed 
under human rights codes14 while limiting its reach to individual decisions and 
declining to extend it to laws of general application.15 In addition, some of these 
cases were argued on the basis of both administrative law and Charter grounds 
6. Congré gation des té moins de Jé hovah de St-Jé rôme-Lafontaine v Lafontaine (Village), 2004 SCC 
48, 2 SCR 650 [Lafontaine cited to SCC].
7. Same-Sex Marriage, Re, 2004 SCC 79, 3 SCR 698 [Reference re Same-Sex Marriage].
8. Multani v Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 2006 SCC 6, 1 SCR 256 [Multani cited 
to SCC].
9. Bruker v Marcovitz, 2007 SCC 54, 3 SCR 607 [Bruker cited to SCC].
10. Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, 2 SCR 567 [Hutterian 
Brethren].
11. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) v C(A), 2009 SCC 30, 2 SCR 181 [AC].
12. SL v Commission scolaire des Chênes, 2012 SCC 7, 1 SCR 235 [SL cited to SCC].
13. Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, 2 SCR 551 [Amselem cited to SCC]; Multani, 
supra note 8; Bruker, supra note 9; Hutterian Brethren, supra note 10; and SL, supra note 12.
14. Multani, supra note 8. 
15. Hutterian Brethren, supra note 10. Note that Hutterian Brethren contradicts Reference re 
Same-Sex Marriage and Edwards Books on this point. In those earlier judgments, the Court 
held that the presence of a religious exemption to facially neutral rules —a form of reasonable 
accommodation—rendered the laws constitutional under the minimal impairment branch of 
the Oakes test. Th e logical corollary of this proposition is that the lack of such an exemption/
accommodation would have rendered these laws unconstitutional. So the real question in 
Hutterian Brethren was not whether legislation can be found unconstitutional for failure 
to make a reasonable accommodation. Rather, the issue is the appropriate constitutional 
remedy in these cases: a constitutional exemption for the claimant under s 24(1) of the 
Charter, the reading-in of an exemption under s 52(1) of the Charter, or a declaration of 
invalidity (perhaps suspended) permitting the legislature to amend the law to provide for an 
exemption.
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(Chamberlain, 16 Trinity Western, 17 Lafontaine, and Multani), with the Court 
opting for the former as the basis for its decision18 and in the process producing a 
Charter-infl ected administrative law. Th e Court has also been required to grapple 
with the vexing problem of the confl ict between religious freedom and the right 
to equality, especially in the context of sexual orientation.19 Th ere is a large and 
interesting critical literature on the jurisprudence, which discusses not only the 
wide range of doctrinal issues raised, but also the broader political disputes out of 
which the cases have arisen. 20
16. Chamberlain v Surrey School District No 36, 2002 SCC 86, 4 SCR 710 [Chamberlain].
17. Trinity Western University v College of Teachers (British Columbia), 2001 SCC 31, 1 SCR 772 
[Trinity Western].
18. Th e Court was sometimes divided on this point: Lafontaine, supra note 6; Multani, supra 
note 8.
19. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 7; Chamberlain, supra note 16; and Trinity 
Western, supra note 17.
20. Benjamin L Berger, “Key Th eoretical Issues in the Interaction of Law and Religion: A Guide 
for the Perplexed” (2011) 19:2 Const Forum Const 41; Benjamin L Berger, “Th e Abiding 
Presence of Conscience: Criminal Justice Against the Law and the Modern Constitutional 
Imagination” (2011) 61:4 UTLJ 579; José Woehrling, “Quand la Cour suprême s’applique 
à restreindre la portée de la liberté de religion: l’arrêt Alberta c. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson 
Colony (2009)” (2011) 45:1 RJT 7; Sara Weinrib, “An Exemption for Sincere Believers: 
Th e Challenge of Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2011) 56:3 McGill LJ 
719; Howard Kislowicz, Richard Haigh & Adrienne Ng, “Calculations of Conscience: 
Th e Costs and Benefi ts of Religious and Conscientious Freedom” (2010-2011) 48:3 
Alta L Rev 679; Luc Tremblay, “Th e Bouchard-Taylor Report on Cultural and Religious 
Accommodation: Multiculturalism by Any Other Name?” (2010-2011) 15:1 Rev Const 
Stud 35; Benjamin L Berger, “Section 1, Constitutional Reasoning and Cultural Diff erence: 
Assessing the Impacts of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 Sup Ct 
L Rev (2d) 25; Louis-Philippe Lampron, “Pour que la Tempête ne s’étende jamais hors du 
verre d’eau: réfl exions sur la protection des convictions religieuses au Canada” (2010) 55:4 
McGill LJ 743; Nathalie Des Rosiers, “Freedom of Religion at the Supreme Court in 2009: 
Multiculturalism at the Crossroads?” (2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 73; Robert E Charney, 
“How Can Th ere Be Any Sin in Sincere? State Inquiries into Sincerity of Religious Belief ” 
(2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 47; Richard Moon, “Accommodation Without Compromise: 
Comment on Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 51 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 
95; Sara Weinrib, “Th e Emergence of the Th ird Step of the Oakes Test in Alberta v. Hutterian 
Brethren of Wilson Colony” (2010) 68:2 UT Fac L Rev 77; FC DeCoste, “Caesar’s Faith: 
Limited Government and Freedom of Religion in Bruker v. Marcovitz” (2009) 32:1 Dal LJ 
153; Margaret H Ogilvie, “Bruker v. Marcovitz: (Get)ting Over Freedoms (Like Contract 
and Religion) in Canada” (2009) 24:2 NJCL 173; Mahmud Jamal, “Recent Developments 
in Freedom of Religion” (2009) 27 NJCL 253; Benjamin L Berger, “Th e Cultural Limits 
of Legal Tolerance” (2008) 21:2 Can JL & Jur 245; Benjamin L Berger, “Moral Judgment, 
Criminal Law and the Constitutional Protection of Religion” (2008) 40 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 
513; Louise Langevin et al, “L’aff aire Bruker c. Marcovitz: variations sur un thème” (2008) 
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I want to come at this body of case law from a diff erent angle. One of the 
most striking features of the Court’s recent jurisprudence on section 2(a) is that 
a disproportionate number of cases come out of Quebec21 and, indeed, were 
adjudicated under the Quebec Charter: 22 Amselem, Lafontaine, Multani, Bruker 
and SL. I will suggest that these cases all involve claims for reasonable accommo-
dation. Moreover, as Sébastien Grammond has acutely observed, these decisions 
represent a point of national cleavage in two respects.23 First, in each case the 
Quebec Court of Appeal rejected the section 2(a) claim, and the Supreme Court 
of Canada overturned its decision. Second, these national divisions are arguably 
present on the Supreme Court itself. Th e Court has often divided on national 
lines, with one or more francophone judges from Quebec either writing a 
concurrence (Justice LeBel in Lafontaine) or a sharp dissent (Justice Deschamps 
in Bruker). Moreover, francophone judges from outside Quebec have also broken 
ranks with their colleagues through dissents (Justice Bastarache in Amselem) and 
concurrences (Justice Charron in Multani). Th ough the Court often divides, it 
does so exceedingly rarely along these lines. Th e plurinational dimension of the 
Court’s recent section 2(a) case law is brought into even sharper relief when it is 
juxtaposed with the intense and contemporaneous debate within Quebec over 
49:4 Les Cahiers de Droit 655; Benjamin L Berger, “Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture” 
(2007) 45:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 277; José Woehrling, “La place de la religion dans les écoles 
publiques du Québec” (2007) 41:3 RJT 651; Pierre Bosset & Pail Eid, “Droit et religion: de 
l’accommodement raisonnable à un dialogue internormatif?” (2007) 41:2 RJT 513; Kathryn 
Bromley Chan, “Th e Duelling Narratives of Religious Freedom: A Comment on Syndicat 
Northcrest v. Amselem” (2005-2006) 43:2 Alta L Rev 451; Bruce Ryder, “State Neutrality and 
Freedom of Conscience and Religion” (2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 169; David M Brown, 
“Neutrality or Privilege? A Comment on Religious Freedom” (2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 
221; Richard Moon, “Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem” 
(2005) 29 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 201; Richard Moon, “Sexual Orientation Equality and 
Religious Freedom in the Public Schools: A Comment on Trinity Western University v. B.C. 
College of Teachers and Chamberlain v. Surrey School Board District 36” (2003) 8:2 Rev Const 
Stud 228; Richard Moon, “Liberty, Neutrality, and Inclusion: Religious Freedom Under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2003) 41:1 Brandeis LJ 563; Benjamin 
L Berger, “Th e Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, Secularism, and the Liberal State” 
(2002) 17 CJLS 39; Richard Moon, ed, Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2008); Howard Adelman & Pierre Anctil, eds, Religion, Culture, and the State: 
Refl ections on the Bouchard-Taylor Report (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011); 
Sébastien Grammond, “Conceptions canadienne et québécoise des droits fondamentaux et 
de la religion: convergence or confl it?” (2009) 43:1 RJT 83.
21. Lafontaine, supra note 6; Multani, supra note 8; Bruker, supra note 9; SL, supra note 12; and 
Amselem, supra note 13.
22. Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, RSQ, c C-12 [Quebec Charter].
23. Grammond, supra note 20. 
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the accommodation of religious minorities, in which the Court’s decisions—
especially Multani—are a central part. Th ese debates have highlighted a large and 
arguably growing divide between Quebec and the rest of Canada (RoC) with 
respect to the strong claims for neutrality and secular democracy advanced by 
Quebec’s francophone political elites. Th e cleavages on the Supreme Court have 
sometimes tracked these larger political divides.
In this article, I address the plurinational dimension of the Supreme Court’s 
recent religious freedom cases by focusing on divisions within the Court itself. 
I link this line of case law to an earlier episode of Canadian constitutional politics 
when the Charter, as the instrument of pan-Canadian nation building, was 
used to intervene in our seemingly endless debates over national unity. Th is was 
evident through a series of legal disputes under the Charter regarding the 
constitutionality of Quebec’s policies to promote the French language, which 
were ultimately resolved by the Court. What we may now be witnessing is a new 
chapter in the complex story of Quebec, Canada, and the Charter. Th is time, 
however, the point of dispute is not language, but religion. Th e Quebec cases, 
as a group, have brought this issue before the Court. I think the Supreme Court is 
aware of this broader political context and is groping incrementally towards a kind of 
consensus position on the character of the “neutral” state in order to close this divide 
against the backdrop of an intense political debate on these issues in Quebec.
I. LINGUISTIC NATION BUILDING, THE CHARTER, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT
Let me provide some intellectual and political context for my argument by 
revisiting the history of Quebec’s language policies, the Charter, and the Supreme 
Court. Th ere is a familiar story here: Th e Charter was adopted as an instrument 
of pan-Canadian nation building to compete with the centrifugal eff ects of 
Quebec nationalism.24 Until the 1960s, Quebec’s constitutional claims had been 
defensive, aimed at safeguarding its existing areas of jurisdiction. In the 1960s, 
Quebec’s goals shifted to ethno-national linguistic nation building and expansion 
of its jurisdiction over social and economic policy. Th e basic political objective 
of the Charter was to combat Quebec nationalism by regulating linguistic nation 
building in Quebec and by constituting a pan-Canadian political community.
24. See Sujit Choudhry, “Bills of Rights as Instruments of Nation Building in Multinational 
States: Th e Canadian Charter and Quebec Nationalism” in James B Kelly & Christopher P 
Manfredi, eds, Contested Constitutionalism: Refl ections on the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 233.
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In regulative terms, the Charter imposes legal restraints on minority nation 
building by entrenching rights to interprovincial mobility and to minority language 
education. Both rights can be understood as a response to potential or actual 
policies of linguistic nation building within Quebec. Indeed, Quebec objected 
to both protections precisely on that basis. In addition, the Charter was intended 
to function constitutively as the germ of a common Canadian nationalism. In a 
federal state such as Canada, where citizens share Charter rights irrespective of 
language or province of residence, the Charter serves as a transcendent form of 
political identifi cation—the spine of common citizenship that unites members of 
a linguistically diverse and geographically dispersed polity.
Th e clash between the Charter and Quebec’s nation-building policies gener-
ated three important cases before the Supreme Court.25 In all three cases, the 
Court found these policies to be unconstitutional. In Ford v Quebec (Attorney 
General),26 the Court struck down a provision in Quebec’s Charter of the French 
Language 27 that required outdoor commercial signage to be exclusively in French. 
According to the Court, the law was disproportionate to the objective of ensuring 
that Quebec’s “visage linguistique” be French. Instead, a measure requiring that 
French be predominant would have suffi  ced. Th ere were also two important cases 
regarding minority language education. A fl ashpoint during the adoption of the 
Charter was the “Canada Clause,” which grants citizens educated in English at 
the primary level anywhere in Canada the right to have their children educated 
in English in Quebec.28 Th is right was specifi cally directed at a provision in 
Quebec’s Charter of the French Language that required those individuals to educate 
their children in French in order to promote the linguistic integration of inter-
provincial migrants to Quebec in the same way that international migrants were 
encouraged to integrate. Th is provision was struck down by the Court in one 
of its earliest decisions under the Charter: Quebec Protestant School Board.29 Th e 
Charter also grants children who have received schooling in English anywhere 
else in the country the right to continue schooling in English in Quebec. In 
Solski (Tutor of ) v Quebec (Attorney General),30 the Court rejected an attempt to 
25. See Sujit Choudhry & Richard Stacey, “Independent or Dependent? Constitutional Courts 
in Divided Societies” in Colin Harvey & Alex Schwartz, eds, Rights in Divided Societies 
(Oxford: Hart, 2012) 87 at 104-112.
26. [1988] 2 SCR 712, 54 DLR (4th) 577 [Ford].
27. RSQ, c C-11.
28. Charter, supra note 1, s 23.
29. Quebec Assn of Protestant School Boards v Quebec (Attorney General) (No 2), [1984] 2 SCR 66, 
10 DLR (4th) 321 [Quebec Protestant School Board].
30. 2005 SCC 14, 1 SCR 201 [Solski].
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construe this right narrowly and read down the challenged provision to comply 
with the Charter.
Th ere are three noteworthy features of these decisions. First, in all three 
cases, Quebec lost, and the Charter did indeed serve to constrain Quebec’s ability 
to establish French as the common language of political, economic, and social life 
in that province. Second, while the Court applied the Charter to limit Quebec’s 
linguistic nation-building policies, it nonetheless accepted that the purpose 
underlying these policies met the legitimate objective test. Th e constitutional 
defect in the laws was that, as framed or construed by the government, they failed 
at the minimal impairment stage of the proportionality analysis. Th ird, the judg-
ments were unanimous and were handed down by “Th e Court” as an institution 
rather than by an individual judge with whom the rest of the Court concurred. 
Collective authorship by the entire Court is rare and indicates the greatest 
possible degree of consensus among the justices.
Th ese pieces all fi t together. Th eir signifi cance becomes clear if one recalls 
that the Court is a regionally representative body, with three of nine judges 
coming from Quebec, three from Ontario, and one from British Columbia, the 
Prairies, and Atlantic Canada, respectively. However, Quebec’s representation is 
special, as is refl ected by the fact that it is the only province whose representation 
has always been legally guaranteed. When the Court’s membership was enlarged 
to nine in 1949, the Supreme Court Act was amended to require that three of the 
judges be from Quebec.31 Later, the Constitution Act, 1982 entrenched Quebec’s 
representation on the Court by requiring that changes thereto be made by unanimous 
federal and provincial consent.32 By contrast, the regional distribution of the 
remaining seats is a matter of constitutional convention and is not provided by a 
statute or constitutional provision. An important justifi cation for the special rules 
governing Quebec’s representation on the Court is that the Supreme Court takes 
civil law appeals from Quebec and therefore requires judges with the requisite 
expertise. But the deeper rationale is that the composition of the Court refl ects 
and institutionalizes the plurinational character of Canada. Quebec is a constituent 
nation in Canada’s plurinational federation, with boundaries drawn to create a 
permanent francophone majority and with jurisdiction to adopt public policies 
that protect French as the common public language of economic, political, and 
social life in that province. Quebec’s national status entitles it to a guaranteed 
minimum level of representation in a federal institution—such as the Supreme 
Court—that makes important decisions delimiting the scope of Quebec’s power 
31. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 6.
32. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 41.
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to pursue such policies. A Court that ruled on these issues without judges from 
Quebec would be widely perceived as constitutionally illegitimate within that 
province.33
Th is much is well known. But far less thought has been given to the interesting 
question of how the plurinational character of the Court’s membership is supposed 
to play out in adjudication, especially with respect to cases arising out of Quebec. 
As a technical matter, the Quebec judges enjoy no special powers relative to other 
judges, either individually or collectively. But with regard to cases of special interest 
to Quebec—for example, those that concern the power of Quebec to engage in 
linguistic nation building—as a matter of constitutional practice, the Quebec 
judges might play a diff erent institutional role in the Court’s decision making. 
Consider the following counter-factual scenario: Imagine that in Ford, Quebec 
Protestant School Board, and Solski, the Court had divided on national lines. Th e 
Quebec judges voted to uphold the policies under challenge, perhaps fi nding that 
while there had been a breach of a Charter right, the breach was justifi ed under 
section 1. A majority of the Court, however, struck them down. Moreover, imagine 
that the majority went further than holding that the measures were dispropor-
tionate, as the Court actually did. Rather, it held that the objective of preserving 
and enhancing the status of French as Quebec’s common language was per se 
illegitimate, because the language laws in question sought to redistribute 
economic and political power away from Anglophones toward Francophones and 
were therefore discriminatory. Moreover, when it rendered judgment in those 
appeals, the Quebec justices were all francophone and the justices from the rest 
of Canada were all anglophone, so that the division on the Court in this 
hypothetical scenario would not only have pitted Quebec against the RoC 
justices, but also francophone versus anglophone justices. Under this hypothetical 
scenario, the disagreement on the Court would have been basic and fundamental, 
and it would have been plurinational in character.
If this had happened, the dissent by the Quebec judges would have been 
more than the routine disagreement that occurs on multi-member courts in the 
common law world, including the Supreme Court of Canada. Given the 
political origins of the Charter and the singular importance of the challenged 
laws to modern Quebec nationalism, a Court divided on national lines would 
have served to undermine the legitimacy of the Charter, and perhaps even the 
33. See Sujit Choudhry, “Not a New Constitutional Court: Th e Canadian Charter, the Supreme 
Court and Quebec Nationalism” in Pasquale Pasquino & Francesca Billi, eds, Th e Political 
Origins of Constitutional Courts: Italy, Germany, France, Poland, Canada, United Kingdom 
(Rome: Adriano Olivetti Foundation, 2009) 39 at 53-66.
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Court itself, within Quebec. Th is would have been a disaster. Th e decision to 
speak unanimously as a single institution indicates an awareness that, with 
respect to these divisive issues, it was important to present a collective front 
that transcended the national divide built into the Court’s design. Th e Court’s 
choice emphasized the fact that what drove the judgment was not the national 
origin of the individual judge authoring the opinion, but the Court’s collective 
understanding of the Charter and its relationship to the project of Quebec 
nationalism. Framing its holding in this way protected both the legitimacy of 
the Charter and the Court itself. Moreover, in these three cases, the judgments 
occupied an intermediate position between polar extremes. Th e Court struck 
down the provisions under challenge, but left space for Quebec to pursue those 
policies by accepting Quebec’s objectives as constitutionally legitimate.34 Th us, 
the constitutional fl aw was framed as the proportionality of the response, not the 
very idea of the policy itself.
We now come back to the question of how Quebec’s representation on the 
Court aff ects how the Court resolves cases. What role did the Quebec judges 
play in the Court’s internal deliberations on the Quebec language cases? We do 
not, and may never, really know. Th ere are two conceptual possibilities, which 
we can term the bargaining and the deliberative accounts. On the bargaining 
account, the Quebec judges had political leverage because of the political 
costs of a dissenting judgment to the Charter and the Court. Th eir leverage was 
insuffi  cient to save Quebec’s legislation, but it was enough to shape the manner 
in which it was struck down. As the price for a unanimous judgment, the Quebec 
judges were able to negotiate the acceptance of the legality of Quebec’s legislative 
objective, thereby allowing Quebec to enact a more narrowly-tailored policy that 
would pursue the same goal and survive a subsequent constitutional challenge.
But this is too simplistic a picture of how judges interact on a multi-member 
court, especially when they work within an institution governed by a highly 
specialized, technical, and professional discourse that renders inadmissible such 
crude political horse-trading. Th e deliberative account off ers an alternative 
explanation. What the Quebec judges brought to these cases was an alertness 
to, and an understanding of, the roots of modern Quebec nationalism. To a 
34. Th e Quebec Protestant School Board is ambiguous on this point and can be read either 
to impliedly suggest that the objective of preserving and enhancing the status of French 
as Quebec’s common language was per se illegitimate or that the means chosen were 
disproportionate. Of important context is that the judgment is an early, pre-Oakes 
decision, handed down before the Court determined the doctrinal framework for s 1. 
As a consequence, the judgment must be interpreted through the lens of the subsequent 
development in the jurisprudence.
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considerable extent, this nationalism arose as a defensive response to Ottawa’s 
dramatically increased role in economic and social policies after the Second 
World War. Federal policy activism meant an increase in the importance of 
federal institutions, especially the federal bureaucracy, which worked in English 
and in which francophone Quebeckers were a small minority. Another factor 
was enormous social change within Quebec. After the war, Quebec underwent 
massive urbanization and industrialization, and Anglophones dominated many 
professions, including positions of economic leadership. Th ese demographic and 
economic shifts underscored and reinforced the role of language as the basis for 
the unequal distribution of economic power within the province. Quebec 
responded by mobilizing Francophones around linguistic nation building, which 
encompassed the construction of a set of economic and political institutions to 
ensure the survival of a modern, francophone society. Th e Quebec judges on 
the Supreme Court, as members of Quebec’s elite who had lived through these 
transformations and were indeed products of them, brought to the conference 
table an understanding of both the origins and importance of these policies and 
were therefore able to persuade their colleagues from outside the province of their 
constitutional legitimacy. Th is led the Court to hold that the legislative objec-
tives were  justifi ed under section 1, although the means chosen did not pass 
constitutional muster.
II. THE QUEBEC RELIGION CASES AND THE DUTY TO 
ACCOMMODATE
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
It is against this intellectual and political backdrop that we should read the 
Supreme Court’s recent religion cases that originated in Quebec. As we shall 
see, reasonable accommodation is at the root of Amselem, Lafontaine, Multani, 
Bruker, and SL, even if these cases were not brought or analyzed in that way. 
Th e duty to accommodate was originally developed in the jurisprudence under 
human rights codes. It arose in the employment context, in cases involving 
adverse eff ects discrimination arising from the unequal impact of a facially-neutral 
policy or rule on groups identifi ed by a prohibited ground of discrimination. 
Under human rights codes, employers could defend such policies as bona fi de 
occupational requirements if they met a test of proportionality.35 Th e Supreme 
35. Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536, 52 OR (2d) 
799.
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Court took the view that a facially-neutral rule would fail this test if it could be 
modifi ed in its application to the aff ected group—for example, by granting an 
exemption. Th is duty to accommodate was, however, subject to a requirement 
that it not impose undue hardship on the employer. Determining what constitutes 
undue hardship is a fact-specifi c inquiry that includes consideration of the rights 
of other employees, the costs of accommodation, and the interests served by 
the impugned policy (e.g., safety). In principle, the duty to accommodate 
applies to all grounds of discrimination—for example, disability, sex, age, and 
of course, religion.
Th e duty to accommodate was incorporated into the Charter in a number of 
stages. Initially, in Eldridge v British Columbia (Attorney General), 36 the Supreme 
Court held in a section 15 challenge that the duty to accommodate was part of 
the minimal impairment analysis under the Oakes test.37 Although Eldridge was 
a case involving discrimination on the basis of disability, the analysis extended in 
principle to all prohibited grounds of discrimination under section 15, including 
religion. Some section 15 claims that allege discrimination on the basis of 
religion, however, can also be framed as infringements of section 2(a) if inter-
ference with religious conduct is at stake. It was only a matter of time, therefore, 
before reasonable accommodation arguments were made under section 2(a)—as 
fi rst occurred in Amselem.
Th e decisions in Amselem, Lafontaine, Multani, Bruker, and SL were handed 
down during a period of intense debate within Quebec over claims by members 
of minority religious communities (e.g., Jews, Muslims, and Sikhs). Th e claims 
sought modifi cation of existing institutions, practices, and rules on the ground 
that they discriminated against these communities on the basis of religion. In 
political discourse, these claims were lumped together as claims for accommo-
dation. As the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related 
to Cultural Diff erences (the Bouchard-Taylor Commission) 38 noted, such claims 
are nothing new in Quebec. However, they reached a new level of intensity between 
March 2006 and May 2007, sparked by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Multani. Indeed, they became campaign issues during the 2008 and 2012 elections. 
Th e need for any governing party in Quebec to have signifi cant support from 
some segment of the nationalist electorate has led the major political parties to 
formulate policies in response. While in government in 2010, the Liberal Party 
36. [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577 [Eldridge].
37. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200.
38. Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation (Quebec: Government of Quebec, 2008) 
[Bouchard-Taylor Report].
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introduced Bill 94,39 which would have prohibited civil servants and anyone 
doing business with the government (including those receiving services) from 
wearing any religious garment that covers the face. Th e Parti Quebecois, which 
recently won the largest number of seats in the 2012 provincial election, 
campaigned on the promise to introduce a Charter of Secularism that would ban 
public employees from wearing “overt” religious symbols.40 
Political debates on accommodation became so heated that they prompted 
the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission with the short-term goal of 
temporarily removing this issue from the public policy agenda for the 2008 election. 
It is fair to say that accommodation has emerged as a new dimension in the 
politics of collective identity in Quebec, adding questions about secular democracy to 
longstanding concerns about language policy. Upon closer examination, however, 
there was considerable variation in the kinds of religious practices that gave rise 
to these claims, the precise character of the accommodation sought, the types 
of parties against whom such claims were made, and the institutional contexts 
within which the claims were made. For example, while most of the accom-
modations at issue were sought in government institutions (e.g., public schools), 
some arose in the broader public sector (e.g., hospitals), and yet others in clearly 
private contexts (e.g., private schools and condominiums) by individuals whose 
relationships with those organizations were governed by contract. In addition, 
the spheres within which those institutions operated—health care, education, 
political participation, housing, and sports—varied as well. A wide range of 
institutional policies were placed at issue concerning diet (e.g., in hospitals), 
dress codes (e.g., in public employment), the delivery of health services, and 
voting procedures. Finally, the accommodations sought varied, taking the form 
of exemptions (e.g., to permit the wearing of a kirpan at schools), new public 
programs (e.g., to provide for female physicians at a patient’s request), subsidies 
to private entities (e.g., to private religious schools), and reallocation of existing 
physical space (e.g., to create prayer rooms in public universities). Indeed, some 
of the claims by religious minorities were not for accommodation of their 
religious practices at all; rather, they argued that public institutions should be 
prohibited from engaging in practices that endorsed the majority faith (e.g., the 
practice of reciting a Christian prayer at municipal council meetings).41
39. An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests within the Administration and 
certain institutions, 1st Sess, 39th Leg, Quebec, 2010.
40. Parti Quebecois, “L’avenir du Québec est entre vos mains : la plateforme électorale du 
Parti Québécois” (4 August 2012), online: <http://pq.org/actualite/communiques/
lavenir_du_quebec_est_entre_vos_mains_consultez_notre_plateforme_electorale>.
41. Bouchard-Taylor Report, supra note 38.
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As we shall see, the case law focuses on a much narrower cluster of situations 
that clearly raise the duty to accommodate in its narrower, legal sense. Th e gap 
between political discourse and legal argument raises the question of whether it 
is illuminating to read the Supreme Court’s decisions in their broader political 
context, given the lack of precision with which the term accommodation is used. 
But it would be deeply artifi cial to push the broader political context away for 
two reasons. 
First, on questions of accommodation, there is an intimate connection 
between law and politics. Some of the most politically controversial examples of 
accommodation were brought in legal proceedings on the basis of the Quebec Charter 
and the Charter. As the Bouchard-Taylor Report noted, religious minorities are 
not seeking to act illegally; rather, they are advancing their claims by asserting 
constitutional and statutory rights in administrative tribunals and courts. Th e 
debate over accommodation is not just about the particular claims advanced. It 
is also about the legal instruments that are the basis of these claims, and about 
the proposals to change the legal status quo and thereby overrule the courts. For 
example, the Parti Quebecois’ proposed Charter of Secularism would amend the 
Quebec Charter to eliminate the duty to accommodate in certain circumstances 
where it had previously been judicially recognized. It is vital that we off er a fair 
account of the jurisprudence to inform those broader debates. 
Second, the Supreme Court itself has been drawn into the politics of accom-
modation within Quebec. Th is was especially the case in Multani, which held that a 
Sikh boy had the right to wear a kirpan to school under strict conditions. Th e Court 
was sharply attacked for placing religious freedom above the safety of schools, and 
for lacking common sense. Indeed, Multani was probably the single most important 
reason for the establishment of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. Moreover, there 
is no sharp divide between the concepts, distinctions, and frameworks employed in 
the political discourse and judicial decision making. In addition, the Court is likely 
aware of the broader political context surrounding its judgments, and it is plausible 
to read the trajectory of its jurisprudence—from division to tentative consensus—
as an attempt to speak in a single institutional voice in order to protect its own 
legitimacy and that of the Charter.
Th ere is another dimension to the politics of accommodation in Quebec 
that buttresses the last point. By no means are the issues raised by claims for 
accommodation confi ned to Quebec. Across Canada, there are questions about 
the legitimate scope of accommodation—that is, what accommodations for 
religious practices count as reasonable? We only need to look at Ontario, where 
the furor over the use of shari’a law to govern property division and spousal 
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support for Muslim couples through marriage contracts prompted a legislative 
ban on this practice.42 But one of the most striking features of the politics 
of accommodation is an increasing gulf between public attitudes in Quebec 
and those in the RoC. Revealing evidence comes from a public opinion poll in 
2007,43 at the height of the accommodation controversy. On a range of particu-
lar examples, respondents in the RoC were much more willing to accept claims 
for accommodation than Quebeckers, for example permitting Muslim women 
who wear hijabs to teach in public schools (75% in the RoC versus 48% in 
Quebec), permitting Muslim girls to wear hijabs in public schools (70% in the 
RoC versus 43% in Quebec), permitting Jewish physicians to wear yarmulkes in 
hospitals (75% in the RoC versus 47% in Quebec), and permitting prayer facilities 
in colleges or universities (66% in the RoC versus 33% in Quebec).44 Th e 
Bouchard-Taylor Report cited other poll fi ndings that reached the same conclusion.45 
Th ese fi ndings are buttressed by anecdotal evidence: In no other province are 
questions of accommodation as intense or as central to provincial politics, 
especially during provincial election campaigns. Indeed, nothing approaching 
Bill 94 and the Quebec Charter of Secularism has been proposed by any major 
political party in the RoC.
In short, questions of accommodation have become a point of cleavage 
between Quebec and the RoC. Th e roots of the particular salience of secularism 
in Quebec lie in the origins of modern Quebec nationalism. A central element 
of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution was rejection of the institutionalized role of the 
Roman Catholic Church in the delivery of health care, education, and social 
services, and of its related role as the arbiter of public morality in the service of 
conservative values. Th e replacement of the Church in these realms by newly 
created state institutions, coupled with a liberal social morality free from the 
strictures of the Church, marked the foundation of modern Quebec. To be sure, 
this kind of institutional transformation was not unique to Quebec; a parallel 
process occurred in the other provinces. But the rejection of the institutional role 
of the Church in Quebec was a central element of nationalist mobilization in the 
1950s. Indeed, it can be said that modern Quebec nationalism is as much about 
secular nation building as it was about linguistic nation building. 
42. Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006, SO 2006, c C-1.
43. Jack Jedwab, “Reasonable Accommodation of Immigrants and Religious Minorities and the 
Quebec Distinction” (2007), online: Association for Canadian Studies, <http://www.acs-aec.
ca/pdf/polls/11932375929163.pdf>.
44. Ibid at 2.
45. Ibid at 66.
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What this means is that the politics of accommodation assumes an addition-
al dimension in Quebec. Along with language policy, it has become part of the 
politics of plurinationalism. Th e jurisprudence on accommodation is thus a new 
element of a larger debate over the relationship between the Charter, the Supreme 
Court, and Quebec nationalism. At the advent of the Charter, this could not have 
been foreseen. So, we must assess the roles of the Court and the Charter as cen-
tralizing checks not only on linguistic nation building, but also on secular nation 
building. Th e same institutional issues arise for the Court as in language cases. If 
the Court were to persistently divide along national lines in its religion cases, this 
would pose challenges to the legitimacy of the Charter and the Supreme Court 
within Quebec. As we shall see, the pattern on the Court is not so neat. Instead of 
the Quebec judges penning concurrences or dissents as a bloc, there is a pattern 
in which some of the francophone judges from within and outside Quebec part 
company with their colleagues. But as Grammond argues, they appear to share 
a distinct “Quebecois” approach to these issues, which might be a product of 
sharing the same legal, professional, educational, and cultural milieu.46 Th e fact 
that the case law manifested such divisions, particularly against the backdrop of 
ongoing public controversy in Quebec, is politically salient and creates the pres-
sure for consensus on the Court.
B. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND SECTION 2(A)
Th e decisions on reasonable accommodation were handed down while Canada’s 
constitutional jurisprudence on freedom of religion was very much a work in 
progress. In the liberal constitutional tradition, the stance of states toward 
religion combines an attitude of non-endorsement and non-interference. 
Non-endorsement means that the state has no offi  cial religion, but instead has a 
secular identity that renders it neutral among contending faiths. Non-interference 
means that individuals have the unfettered right to choose their religious affi  liation, 
or to reject it entirely, within a legal framework that guarantees that these choices 
are free from force or fraud. 
Th e Court’s early jurisprudence on the Charter began to incorporate these 
ideas into Canadian constitutional law. Section 2(a) of the Charter guarantees 
“freedom of conscience and religion,” which is clearly a constitutional guarantee 
of non-interference. Th us, in Big M the Court held that section 2(a) entrenches 
freedom to and freedom from religion, and it built both freedoms around 
the notion of state coercion. Th is section guarantees the right to hold religious 
46. Grammond, supra note 20 at 90.
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beliefs, to communicate them publicly, and to act upon them. It also protects 
individuals from coercive measures that interfere with those activities. Th e Court 
in Big M also held that section 2(a) protects individuals against coerced religious 
affi  liation, declaration, and conduct. However, the status of non-endorsement was 
much weaker in these earlier cases. Indeed, the early Charter cases did not adopt such 
a doctrine, in part because of the absence of an obvious textual hook to do so—for 
example, the Charter has no analog to the American anti-establishment clause.47
To be sure, some of the same work can be done by a suitably expansive 
doctrine of non-interference. For example, compelled religious observance can 
be condemned not only on the basis of non-endorsement, but also on the basis 
of non-interference. Moreover, the Court extended the notion of compulsion 
or coercion beyond the use of criminal sanctions to include economic incentives 
and psychological or social pressure. Th is broadened the scope of both the freedom 
to and the freedom from religion to include policies that create economic incentives 
not to engage in religious observance,48 as well as psychological pressure to 
engage in offi  cial religious observance (at least in the Ontario Court of Appeal).49 
However, the notion of non-endorsement extends conceptually beyond even the 
broadest defi nition of coercive measures to an array of public policies that do 
not include elements of coercion. It includes, for example, the adoption of an 
offi  cial religion and its symbolic endorsement (e.g., the reading of the Lord’s 
Prayer at sessions of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario). In addition, there are 
policies that do not endorse a religion but that involve the intermingling of the 
state with religious matters (e.g., funding for religious schools, delegating the 
authority to marry to religious offi  cials, or the enforcement of religious law). 
Th ese would likely run afoul of non-endorsement but not of non-interference so 
long as religious institutions were not given a de jure or de facto monopoly over 
areas of public policy. And while the Court has held that religious objectives for 
legislation were impermissible per se under section 1,50 this is not a free-standing 
constitutional doctrine of non-endorsement because it is only engaged when a 
Charter right has been breached. It provides a basis for ruling out certain justifi -
cations of rights-limiting policies, not an independent basis for impugning the 
constitutionality of government action.
47. Th e anti-establishment clause states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion … .” US Const Amends I.
48. Edwards Books, supra note 3. 
49. Freitag v Penetanguishene (Town) (1999), 47 OR 3d 301, 179 DLR (4th) 150 (CA); 
Zylberberg v Sudbury (Bd of Education) (1988), 65 OR (2d) 641, 52 DLR (4th) 577 (CA).
50. Big M, supra note 2.
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Th e Quebec cases raised a new issue for the Court under section 2(a): 
reasonable accommodation. What the Quebec cases show is that the Quebec 
judges on the Supreme Court resisted claims for reasonable accommodation by 
articulating, defending, and developing the doctrine of non-endorsement under 
the constitutional banner of the “neutral state.” Th is idea played out at several 
stages of the constitutional analysis. In Amselem, the neutral state was used by the 
dissenting judges (whose number included Justices LeBel and Deschamps) as the 
basis for their refusal to incorporate the notion of reasonable accommodation into 
article 9.1 of the Quebec Charter, the analog to section 1 of the Charter. Justice 
LeBel’s dissent in Lafontaine, in which he mistakenly characterized the claim as 
one for positive assistance to support religious practices, can also be explained on 
the basis of the concern that accepting the constitutional claim would undermine 
the neutrality of the state. In Bruker, the neutral state was at the heart of Justice 
Deschamps’ forceful dissent, in which she refused to accept that an agreement to 
grant a get (divorce) pursuant to Jewish law was justiciable in the ordinary courts. 
In Multani, it may have been one of the unstated reasons for Justice Deschamps’ 
concurrence, which would have resolved the appeal on non-constitutional, 
administrative law grounds as opposed to invoking the Charter. I now turn to 
these cases.
C.  AMSELEM 
Amselem was a private dispute, but one with important constitutional implications. 
It arose from a disagreement between a group of Jewish condominium owners 
and the condominium corporation over the formers’ erection of succahs on their 
balconies, which are used in the observance of the religious festival of Succot. 
Th e erection of these structures violated the building by-laws, which were facially 
neutral but prohibited the use of balconies for this purpose. Because this was a 
dispute between private parties in Quebec, the Quebec Charter—rather than the 
Charter—governed the dispute. Th is was the fi rst case in which the plurinational 
dimension of a dispute was refl ected in the split on the Supreme Court. Th e 
majority judgment, penned by Justice Iacobucci, was joined by the other 
anglophone judges (save Justice Binnie), while the principal dissent was written 
by Justice Bastarache and joined by the two remaining francophone judges, Justices 
LeBel and Deschamps. 
In the lower courts, the case was framed as a claim for accommodation. 51 
Th e claimants argued that the by-laws infringed their right to engage in conduct 
51. Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, [2002] RJQ 906, JQ no 705 (CA) [Amselem (CA)], aff ’g 
[1998] RJQ 1892, RDI 489 (CS civ).
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rooted in their religious beliefs. According to the claimants, this entitled them 
to an accommodation in the form of an exemption from the operation of the 
by-laws for the duration of Succot. Curiously, the language of reasonable 
accommodation was not carried forward into the Supreme Court, but the gist 
of the legal claim remained the same. Importantly, this was the fi rst reasonable 
accommodation case under freedom of religion to arise from Quebec. Moreover, 
the case was understood by the entire Court to be of constitutional signifi cance. 
Th e majority and dissents, notwithstanding their deep disagreement, agreed on a 
basic interpretive issue: Although the appeal was being decided under the Quebec 
Charter, the interpretation of the freedom of religion under the Charter would 
be identical. 
Th e divergent approaches of the majority and principal dissent on the 
limitation analysis bear careful examination. Section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter 
provides that the rights guaranteed by the Charter are subject to limitations in 
the name of “democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the 
citizens of Québec.”52 Th ere was an important and revealing diff erence in how 
the majority and the principal dissent conceptualized the interpretation of section 
9.1 and applied it to the case at hand. For the majority, the interpretation of 
section 9.1, even in private disputes, was very similar to a standard section 1 
analysis under the Charter. Th e majority therefore enumerated the counter-
vailing rights of the other co-owners that were also protected by the Quebec 
Charter—their rights to property and security—which in turn undergirded 
three concerns about the erection of succahs: safety (succahs would obstruct fi re 
escapes), economic (succahs would lower the value of the property), and aesthetic 
(succahs would disrupt the uniform external appearance of the building). Th e 
majority then considered the importance of these interests. Since the majority 
found that the safety and economic interests were real, the issue was the degree 
to which they were impaired by accommodation. Th e majority considered the 
impairment quite minimal. Th e conclusion was highly fact-specifi c, in a manner 
typical of a section 1 analysis, involving a close examination of the limited 
duration of the accommodation and its physical design (which minimized 
safety and economic concerns). In short, the majority’s section 9.1 analysis was 
in substance identical to a minimal impairment analysis under section 1, which 
might have reached a diff erent conclusion had one or more of these factual 
details been diff erent. Moreover, although the majority did not expressly invoke 
the duty to accommodate, its analysis was materially the same.
52. Quebec Charter, supra note 22.
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Th e majority treated the purported aesthetic interest diff erently. In addition 
to holding that the aesthetic impact of the succahs was minimal, the majority 
went further and opined:
In a multiethnic and multicultural country such as ours, which accentuates and 
advertises its modern record of respecting cultural diversity and human rights and 
of promoting tolerance of religious and ethnic minorities — and is in many ways an 
example thereof for other societies —, the argument of the respondent that nominal, 
minimally intruded-upon aesthetic interests should outweigh the exercise of the 
appellants’ religious freedom is unacceptable. Indeed, mutual tolerance is one of 
the cornerstones of all democratic societies. Living in a community that attempts to 
maximize human rights invariably requires openness to and recognition of the rights 
of others. In this regard, I must point out, with respect, that labelling an individual’s 
steadfast adherence to his or her religious beliefs “intransigence”, as Morin J.A. 
asserted at para. 64 [in his judgment in the Quebec Court of Appeal], does not 
further an enlightened resolution of the dispute before us.53
Th e majority doubted whether aesthetic interests were suffi  ciently important, 
even in principle, to constitute a legitimate reason to restrict religious freedom. 
But it also came very close to saying that the assertion of these interests was in 
fact motivated by a rejection of the very idea of religious diversity, which is 
an inadmissible reason to limit a guaranteed right under the Quebec Charter and 
no doubt under the Charter as well. Th e majority’s strong rebuke to Justice Morin 
for his criticism of the rights-claimants fi ts with this reading of its reasons.54
Th e principal dissent is a study in contrasts. Justice Bastarache took pains to 
emphasize that the limitation analysis under section 9.1 “is clearly diff erent from 
the duty to accommodate.”55 By implication, this is how he characterized the 
majority’s approach to section 9.1. Rather, Justice Bastarache proposed that the 
appropriate framework is the “reconciliation of rights.”56 What turns on Justice 
Bastarache’s distinction between accommodation and reconciliation? For Justice 
Bastarache, a reasonable accommodation analysis entailed “a simple inquiry into 
the relative importance of the infringement of the co-owners’ rights” and was “a 
question of simply comparing the inconvenience for one party with the incon-
venience for the other … .”57 So the reconciliation of rights must be a diff erent 
kind of exercise. How? On its very terms, the rights of others—in this case, other 
co-owners—must count in the reconciliation of rights. But the rights of others 
53. Amselem, supra note 13 at para 87, referring to Amselem (CA), supra note 50.
54. Amselem, supra note 13.
55. Ibid at para 154.
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid.
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also count under the duty to accommodate. What is the additional element? 
Justice Bastarache seems to suggest that it may consist of “the demands of social 
existence,”58 “the public interest,”59 or more precisely, “the common interest of all 
citizens of Quebec.”60 
Th is suggests that there is a collective interest at stake in what the majority 
characterized as a private dispute between property owners, which cannot be 
reduced to the rights of the co-owners resisting the claim for reasonable 
accommodation. But the principal dissent never quite states what this additional, 
collective interest is. Towards the end of its reasons, however, the principal 
dissent off ered a clue when it said, “it should be noted that all the co-owners have 
an interest in maintaining harmony in the co-owned property … .”61 What kind 
of harmony is this? Why would it be jeopardized by the succahs? Th e principal 
dissent is maddeningly vague. 
Th ere are three possible interpretations of harmony: aesthetic, legal, and 
political. Th e aesthetic interpretation is that harmony means visual harmony. Th e 
diffi  culty is that this is an interest protected by the rights of each objecting co-owner; 
it is not a collective interest that goes above and beyond the individual owners. Th e 
legal interpretation of harmony is that in the civil law tradition that underpins the 
interpretation of the Quebec Charter, one must interpret rights to avoid any potential 
confl ict between them—that is, one must harmonize their meanings. Th is is a more 
plausible reading of Justice Bastarache’s reasons, but again, it goes to the recon-
ciliation of the competing rights of the co-owners and does not explain what the 
collective interest in harmony is. Th e political interpretation is the most persuasive. 
On this account, the crucial detail is that the balconies on which the succahs were 
erected were part of the common portions of the building, although reserved for 
the exclusive use of the owners of the condominiums to which they were attached. 
Th e unstated collective interest at stake related to the character of these common 
portions shared by individuals who disagreed on questions of faith. To engage in 
religiously rooted conduct in these common portions could give rise to confl ict, 
because it would alter the character of those spaces in ways that did not accord with 
the religious beliefs of others who had an equal legal right to those spaces. Moreover, 
confl ict on a piece of private property could fuel broader social confl ict. To avoid 
social confl ict, those spaces should be free of religious conduct. Th ey should be free 
from religious identity; they should be neutral. 
58. Ibid at para 151.
59. Ibid at para 154.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid at para 172.
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Th us, at the root of this reconstruction of the principal dissent in Amselem 
is the idea that neutrality is a means for avoiding confl ict and for maintaining 
harmony in a religiously diverse community. Th is idea is applied in the context 
of a private dispute. Th e doctrine of neutrality (or non-endorsement), however, 
originated as a public law doctrine applicable to public institutions and property. It 
arose during the Protestant Reformation as a tool for preventing political confl ict 
in religiously diverse political communities, where the basic question of consti-
tutional design was what the offi  cial state religion should be. Th is gave rise to 
horrible civil wars, and ultimately, the solution was to banish religion from public 
institutions, establish a neutral state that had no offi  cial religious identity, and 
make religious belief a private matter.
D.  LAFONTAINE 
Th is theory of the religiously neutral state—implicit in the principal dissent in 
Amselem—is set out explicitly in Justice LeBel’s dissenting reasons in Lafontaine, 
which was handed down at the same time. Th e plurality dissent in Amselem 
and Justice LeBel’s dissent in Lafontaine must be read together, although oddly 
enough they do not cross-reference each other. Lafontaine concerned an attempt 
by a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses to build a place of worship. Th e 
municipality’s zoning by-law designated a particular zone of the city for places of 
worship, where the congregation was unable to purchase a parcel of land. Instead, 
it purchased land zoned for commercial use and applied to the city to have the 
property rezoned. Th e city denied the claim without reasons, and the congregation 
challenged this refusal on both administrative law and Charter grounds.
Th e majority held that the municipality breached a common law duty of 
fairness owed to the congregation and did not address the constitutional issues. 
Th e dissenting judges,62 by contrast, dealt with the Charter argument. Th e 
undisputed starting point of the claim was that section 2(a) protected the right 
to build a place of worship, and it would be unconstitutional for the municipality 
to create legal barriers that prevented a congregation from doing so. But, as the 
dissent put it, this was not the issue before the Court because of key fi ndings 
of fact: Land zoned for places of worship was available for purchase and the 
congregation had been unable or unwilling to purchase it. Th e issue, therefore, 
62. Justices Bastarache and Deschamps, who joined the principal dissent in Amselem, concurred 
with Justice LeBel’s dissent in Lafontaine. Justice Major wrote a separate dissent, concurring 
with Justice LeBel’s conclusion that there was no violation of freedom of religion and that 
the Court of Appeal could not review the trial judge’s fi nding of fact about the availability of 
land zoned for places of worship.
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was whether section 2(a) imposed an obligation on a municipality to rezone land 
for use as a place of worship in circumstances where land zoned for this use was 
available for purchase. In the lower courts, this was framed as a claim for reason-
able accommodation. In essence, the argument was that the refusal to rezone the 
land was a breach of section 2(a) and that the minimally impairing alternative 
was to rezone the particular parcel of land in question, while leaving the zoning 
by-laws in place.
Th e dissenting judges’ rejection of the claim was anchored in a theory of 
religious neutrality. According to Justice LeBel, the state’s duty of neutrality is the 
product of a long-term process that involved the gradual separation of church and 
state over a number of centuries as part of the secularization of public institutions. 
Th e net result is a framework for religion-state relations, which “imposes on the 
state and public authorities in relation to all religions and citizens, a duty of 
religious neutrality … .”63 He insisted that “it is no longer the state’s place to 
give active support to any one particular religion.”64 Th e role of the state, in his 
view, “is limited to setting up a social and legal framework in which beliefs 
are respected and members of the various denominations are able to associate 
freely in order to exercise their freedom of worship,”65 such that “the practice 
of religion and the choices it implies relate more to individuals’ private lives or 
to voluntary associations.”66
On Justice LeBel’s account, the idea of the neutral state is the purpose 
underlying and shaping the interpretation of section 2(a). On his argument, once 
the state has set up a legal framework for freedom of religion, its job is done. It is 
under no duty to ensure that religious communities are able to successfully pursue 
their religious projects within that framework. One implication is that section 
2(a) is a negative right, not—save in exceptional circumstances—a positive one. 
Another, more subtle, implication is that the privatization of faith is bundled 
with a libertarian approach to the distribution of material resources through markets. 
Th e state owes no positive duty to redistribute material resources toward religious 
groups even if those resources may be necessary to enable them to pursue their 
religious projects.
For Justice LeBel, the fatal fl aw of the constitutional claim was that it was a 
positive request for the municipality’s assistance to rezone the land in the face of 
the congregation’s inability to purchase land already zoned and available for that 
63. Lafontaine, supra note 6 at para 65.
64. Ibid at para 68.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid at para 67.
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purpose. Th e unstated implication is that the principal barrier to this transaction 
was fi nancial and that rezoning would be a form of subsidy, presumably enabling 
the congregation to purchase less expensive land and use it for religious purposes. 
A right to positive assistance of this kind would contravene the duty of neutrality 
and hence was beyond the scope of section 2(a). 
In essence, the dissent attributed the congregation’s inability to purchase 
land on which to construct a place of worship to private actors and markets, not 
to the municipality. Markets and the decisions of private market actors operate in 
an institutional space free from Charter scrutiny. Hence whatever hardship may 
have resulted from that private sphere was beyond the concern of constitutional 
law. Th e diffi  culty with this argument is that the scarcity of land zoned for places 
of worship, which in turn determined the availability and price of that land, was 
caused by the municipality’s policy decision, namely, the zoning by-law. Moreover, 
the by-law operated as an impediment to land use, in the form of a legal duty not 
to use the land for certain purposes. Th e congregation’s claim for an exemption 
was therefore rooted in a negative right to build a place of worship on privately 
owned land, which the zoning by-law interfered with. 
Indeed, in many situations, what the duty to accommodate requires is an 
exemption from a rule of general application—that is, for the state to refrain 
from acting. Th is is particularly true for religious communities who wish to be 
exempt from the application of duties. Th is was the case in Lafontaine. It was also 
true in Amselem (exemption from the condominium by-laws). Th us, the duty to 
accommodate is in fact often a negative, not a positive, right. Th e diffi  culty with 
Justice LeBel’s reasons is further illustrated by a hypothetical situation. Imagine 
that the municipality had decided not to zone any land for places of worship so 
that private markets for such land did not exist. A congregation that purchased 
private property zoned for commercial use could credibly argue that the municipality 
was interfering with its negative right to build a place of worship without state 
interference, and they could frame a section 2(a) claim on this basis. Th e diff erence 
between this scenario and the one facing the Court in Lafontaine is one of 
degree—not of kind. 
As a result, the negative/positive rights distinction does not really explain 
Justice LeBel’s dissent in Lafontaine. Here is another explanation: Th ere is an 
important ambiguity between two diff erent conceptions of a positive obligation 
arising from the duty to accommodate. In one sense, the duty is a positive right 
in some circumstances because it requires the establishment of new programs, 
the allocation of public funds for them, and the creation of new institutions to 
deliver them. An example would be the provision of separate prenatal classes to 
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women who object on religious grounds to the attendance of men. But there is a 
second sense in which the duty to accommodate imposes positive obligations on 
the state, irrespective of its legal form as a negative or positive right. Any claim for 
accommodation by members of a religious minority implies that the state must 
act to modify its norms, practices, and institutions from the status quo in support 
of religious observance. If one regards religious observance strictly as a private 
matter, which takes place within the framework of liberal rights alongside a strictly 
neutral state that acts neither to impede nor to support religious conduct because 
it is entirely indiff erent to it, then on this view accommodation appears to cross 
a line. Accommodations of religious conduct could be construed as some kind of 
offi  cial approval or endorsement of the beliefs that underpin that conduct, which 
then undercut a claim to state indiff erence. Acting to support a religious practice 
could connote acting in the name of such practice by institutionalizing and 
legitimizing it. On this view, accommodations threaten the very secular character 
of the state. Th is is what may have concerned Justice LeBel. Because the majority 
declined to rule on the constitutional question, it did not set out a counter-vision 
to address the nature of the section 2(a) breach and, more fundamentally, Justice 
LeBel’s theory of the neutral state. 
E.  BRUKER 
Th e case that provided a platform for these competing visions to come to the 
fore was Bruker. Th e parties had been married under both civil law and Jewish 
law. Th e marriage broke down and divorce proceedings were commenced, which 
resulted in a legal divorce settlement. At issue was an agreement between the 
parties to appear before a rabbinical court to obtain a Jewish divorce (a get). Th is 
agreement constituted a clause in the divorce settlement, but the husband did 
not comply. As a consequence, while the wife obtained a civil divorce, she was 
still married under Jewish law. If she chose to re-marry, any children born to the 
second marriage would have been illegitimate in the eyes of her faith. 
Th e wife brought the action to seek damages for breach of the agreement. 
Th e key question on which the Court sharply divided was the threshold question 
of the justiciability of the agreement in the civil courts. Th e agreement created 
an obligation on the parties to engage the institutional machinery and rules of 
the Jewish legal system, and the point in dispute was whether these features of 
the agreement rendered it unenforceable in the secular legal system. Th e diff ering 
approaches of the majority and the dissent on this narrow point were anchored in 
an underlying, deeper disagreement over the theory of the neutral state. 
Th e majority judgment written by Justice Abella appears to have set out a 
two-pronged test to address the issue. Th e fi rst question asked whether the 
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procedures surrounding the negotiation of the agreement, its form, and the 
legal intent behind it were akin to those that characterize contracts in general. 
Th is requirement was met, because the agreement had been negotiated by 
adults, who were advised by legal counsel, “as part of a voluntary exchange of 
commitments intended to have legally enforceable consequences.”67 Th e second 
question was whether the agreement was nonetheless unenforceable because it 
was against public order. For the majority, this was a context-specifi c question to 
be addressed in each case. Th e overall question was whether the agreement was 
“consistent with our laws, policies, and democratic values.”68 As illustrations, the 
majority suggested that an agreement that violated custody or employment laws 
would contravene public order and be unenforceable. 
Th e Court’s understanding of public order is clearly in its infancy, but some 
sense of the direction in which it may head can be gleaned from statements 
made at the outset of the majority’s reasons. On one hand, the majority held that 
Canadians have “[t]he right to have diff erences protected,”69 because of Canada’s 
commitment to multiculturalism, which entails the “recognition that ethnic, 
religious or cultural diff erences will be acknowledged and respected.”70 But there 
are limits: “[T]he assertion of a right based on diff erence” must be “compatible 
with Canada’s fundamental values,” and determination of such compatibility is 
a “complex, nuanced, fact-specifi c exercise that defi es bright-line application.”71 
Although this framework was not set out under the Charter, it addresses the 
same sorts of issues that would arise under a section 1 analysis. Moreover, its 
case-dependent approach is identical to the assessment of the reasonableness of 
claims for religious accommodation. Th ere is therefore an interpretive continuity 
between Bruker and the jurisprudence on reasonable accommodation, which 
justifi es treating them as an integrated whole even if the claim in Bruker was not 
for reasonable accommodation per se under section 2(a). 
Justice Deschamps dissented sharply on the theory of public order. She set 
the tenor for her reasons at the outset, suggesting that it was “obvious that in the 
twenty-fi rst century”72 religious obligations did not provide a cause of action 
cognizable to the civil legal system. She went on to ground her stance in the 
theory of neutrality, the application of which she extended beyond the legislature 
67. Bruker, supra note 9 at para 47.
68. Ibid at para 62.
69. Ibid at para 2.
70. Ibid at para 1.
71. Ibid at para 2.
72. Ibid at para 101.
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and the executive—as set out in Lafontaine—to the courts. She appeared to off er 
two reasons for developing the theory in this direction. First, in a religiously 
diverse society, the judiciary must resolve legal disputes among adherents of 
diff erent faiths. Her concern seems to be that it would be diffi  cult for the courts 
to play this role if they were engulfed in resolving disputes based on “religious 
precepts and undertakings.”73 Th us, just as the theory of neutrality protects the 
state from being drawn into religious confl ict by placing it above the fray, so too 
does it protect the judiciary. Second, her concern is that by enforcing religious 
rules, courts may legitimize them and reinforce their social meanings. Th e 
diffi  culty is that these social meanings may contradict other fundamental values 
in the constitutional order. In the case at hand, for example, Justice Deschamps 
raised the concern that enforcing the obligation to give a get legitimizes the 
corollary of failing to obtain a get—i.e., that children born to parents who have 
not obtained a divorce under Jewish law are illegitimate. She asked rhetorically 
whether enforcing such a rule would attach “opprobrium to a child born to 
unmarried parents … .”74
Justice Deschamps’ reasons are at times emotional and refl ect a deep anxiety 
over the potential consequences of the majority ruling. She states that rendering 
the agreement justiciable would undermine the “hard-won gains”75 of Canadian 
society in the march toward neutrality. She asks whether the decision opens the 
door to using the civil courts “to penalize … failure to pay the Islamic mahr, refusal 
to raise children in a particular faith, refusal to wear the veil, failure to observe 
religious holidays, etc.”76 What is even more striking about Justice Deschamps’ 
dissent is how she anchors the theory of state neutrality and its legal operation in 
this case in a broader political narrative about the evolution of modern Quebec. 
At the heart of her account of modern Quebec is the Quiet Revolution, which 
she refers to twice in her reasons,77 and its stance on the relationship between 
religion and state. Th is is a move of deep constitutional signifi cance because, as 
the debate over reasonable accommodation demonstrates, these issues have a 
particular salience in Quebec, which Justice Deschamps seems to be acknowl-
edging. Moreover, the Quiet Revolution was the beginning of modern Quebec 
nationalism. To be clear, Justice Deschamps does refer to the neutrality of “the 
73. Ibid at para 102.
74. Ibid at para 182.
75. Ibid at para 103.
76. Ibid at para 184.
77. Ibid at paras 120, 182.
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Canadian state”78 and Canada’s openness to all religions. By invoking the Quiet 
Revolution, however, she may be suggesting that Quebec’s distinctive identity 
ought to condition how the courts approach these issues in cases arising from 
that province. Th us, while she suggests that the neutrality of the state is a concept 
in both “Canadian and Quebec law,”79 she may be seeking to highlight that the 
way these issues play out within the province is a function of legal principles rooted 
in that province and, by implication, in its identity. By contrast, the majority 
does not refer to the Quebec Revolution or the fact that issues of religion-state 
relations have a particular salience in that province, thereby rejecting the idea that 
the Quebec character of the case is legally important.
By way of conclusion, it is interesting to observe who did and did not concur 
with Justice Deschamps’ dissent. Justice Charron (another francophone judge 
albeit from outside Quebec), who was appointed to the Supreme Court after 
Amselem and Lafontaine, signed onto her reasons while Justice LeBel joined the 
majority judgment, leaving Justice Deschamps to restate, defend, and develop 
the theory of the neutral state that he had espoused in Lafontaine. What prompted 
Justice LeBel’s change of heart we may never know.
F.  MULTANI 
I now turn to Multani, a highly controversial decision that provoked a public outcry 
in Quebec and prompted the creation of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission. A 
Sikh boy argued that he had a constitutional right to wear a ceremonial dagger, 
a kirpan, underneath his clothing at school. Th e school board originally granted 
him permission to do so, subject to conditions to ensure the kirpan was sealed 
within his clothing and therefore did not pose a risk to his safety or the safety of 
other students. Th e school’s governing board refused to approve this agreement 
on the basis that it contravened a prohibition in the school’s code of conduct on 
the carrying of weapons. Th e claimant appealed this decision administratively 
and challenged the refusal to grant him permission on constitutional and 
administrative law grounds. 
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the wearing of a kirpan fell within 
the scope of section 2(a), but legitimate safety concerns required that it be worn 
subject to the conditions originally set by the school. According to the Court, 
this was a reasonable accommodation. I want to draw attention to Justice 
Deschamps’ concurrence, which would have resolved the issue on administrative 
law grounds. Multani is one of a series of section 2(a) cases brought under both 
78. Ibid at para 182.
79. Ibid at para 184.
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the Charter and administrative law (the others are Trinity Western, Chamberlain, 
and Lafontaine). Th e Court has yet to set out a satisfactory legal framework for 
determining whether to resolve cases on the basis of administrative law or the 
Charter, where a choice between the two is available. Th is question divided the 
Court in Multani. Th e dissent drew a distinction between challenges to decisions 
or orders on the one hand and norms of general application on the other, arguing 
that the Charter is available only to challenge the constitutionality of the latter, 
whereas for the former, only administrative law is available.
Th e dissent gave two justifi cations for this proposition. First, the text of 
section 1 of the Charter refers to a “law,” and it therefore contemplates its use 
only for challenges to norms of general application that either take the form of 
a law or have a law-like structure. Th e negative implication is that the Charter 
as a whole is not appropriate for reviewing individual administrative decisions 
and orders. As the majority noted, the main diffi  culty with this argument is that 
section 1 refers to limitations that are “prescribed by law,” a broad term that 
encompasses norms as well as decisions or orders made pursuant to them. It also 
contradicts a long and well-established line of precedents on Charter application, 
which have held that the application of the Charter to law-making by legislative 
bodies carries with it the implication that the Charter applies to bodies that act 
pursuant to legal authorization. Th is principle has been applied in a number of 
high profi le Charter cases (e.g., Slaight Communications,80 Eldridge,81 Ross,82 and 
Little Sisters83). If the individual decision lies beyond the scope of legal authori-
zation, then this means that the section 1 defense fails at the outset because the 
decision is not prescribed by law—it does not mean that the Charter is inapplicable 
to such disputes. Indeed, this is how the Charter works in the criminal procedure 
context (especially in section 8 cases).
Second, the dissent argued that the notion of reasonable accommodation 
fi ts uncomfortably within the framework of section 1 and is better dealt with as 
a matter of administrative law. Th e dissent’s reasoning is unclear, but it seems to 
turn on a distinction between “microcosmic” and “macrocosmic” legal analysis.84 
A microcosmic legal analysis focuses on the particular circumstances of individu-
als and private parties, whereas a macrocosmic analysis necessitates attention to 
80. Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, 59 DLR (4th) 416 [Slaight 
Communications].
81. Eldridge, supra note 36.
82. Attis v New Brunswick School District No 15, [1996] 1 SCR 825, 133 DLR (4th) 1 [Ross].
83. Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada (Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69, 2 SCR 
1120 [Little Sisters].
84. Multani, supra note 8 at para 132.
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“societal interests,”85 “social facts,”86 and “wider social implications,”87 thus placing 
the individual against the state. It follows, the dissent reasoned, that “[t]hese 
separate streams — public versus individual — should be kept distinct.”88 Th is 
argument does not hold together. On the one hand, it has long been recognized 
that administrative law cases have a macrocosmic character if they involve 
challenges to the legality of policies, which may take the form of legal norms 
through secondary legislation. Moreover, judicial review under administrative 
law, by defi nition, involves challenges to the legality of government decisions, 
even if the underlying dispute that gives rise to the administrative decision is 
between private parties. In many cases, there is no private dimension at all, such 
as in Multani. Conversely, there is nothing in the structure of section 1 that 
precludes its application to individual decisions. To be sure, section 1 may require 
calibration to deal with those situations, but the Court has never said that section 1 is 
inapt for these circumstances.
Th e best justifi cation for the dissent is found in the following paragraph:
Th e scope of the Canadian Charter is broad. Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution of Canada. Th is incomparable tool 
can be used to invalidate laws that infringe fundamental rights and are not justifi ed 
by societal goals of fundamental importance. However, where the concepts specifi c 
to administrative law are suffi  cient to resolve a dispute, it is unnecessary to resort to 
the Canadian Charter.89
Th e dissent is gesturing to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. In legal systems 
around the world, there is a general rule that counsels courts to resolve constitutional 
challenges on non-constitutional grounds, if possible. Th e best-known example 
is the general rule that statutes should be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
constitutional rules, if the language permits. Th e principle behind the doctrine is 
that the power of constitutional judicial review should only be used when absolutely 
necessary, because it establishes hard constraints on legislative power and limits 
subsequent political decision-making. Resolving cases on a non-constitutional basis 
therefore preserves a space for ongoing democratic debate.90
Th e preference for administrative law over constitutional grounds of review 
could be justifi ed on the same basis. As Evan Fox-Decent puts it, “common-law 
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid at para 133.
87. Ibid at para 134.
88. Ibid. 
89. Ibid at para 135.
90. Alexander M Bickel, Th e Least Dangerous Branch: Th e Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).
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judicial review permits the legislature to have the last word through ordinary 
democratic means.”91 Read alongside Justice Deschamps’ clear concerns about 
claims for reasonable accommodation and how they may collide with public 
order,92 this argument may be particularly salient in cases involving reasonable 
accommodation. Like Multani, it preserves a space for a legislated response to 
the question of reasonable accommodation of religious practices. Th e legislative 
process provides a platform for the inclusion of a broader set of social interests—
such as the idea of the neutral state—in framing a comprehensive legislative 
response to these claims across a variety of institutional contexts, from public 
schools to universities, hospitals, and public sector workplaces. It also allows for 
the legislature to set constraints on case-by-case decision making by the courts 
in reasonable accommodation cases. Indeed, the pains Justice Deschamps took 
to distinguish between reasonable accommodation and minimal impairment is 
highly suggestive, because it implies that a legislated framework for resolving 
these claims need not comply with the duty to accommodate precisely because of 
the broader array of relevant interests at play.
III. CONCLUSION: SL AND OPEN SECULARISM?
When the Charter was adopted, the great confl ict between a pan-Canadian bill of 
rights and Quebec nationalism was expected to centre on questions of language. To 
be sure, legislative eff orts by the government of Quebec to establish French as the 
common public language of economic, political, and social life, by regulating 
the language of the marketplace and the education system, have been fl ashpoints 
of constitutional confl ict. But as the Charter enters its third decade, religion-state 
relations have emerged as a new dimension of the politics of plurinationalism 
in Canada, with a divide emerging between Quebec and the RoC on questions 
of reasonable accommodation. Th is should not be surprising, since the Quiet 
Revolution was about an integrated project of linguistic and secular nation building, 
centred around the institutions of the Quebec state. 
While Quebec’s language policies generated important cases under the 
Charter soon after its adoption, issues of religion have only done so in the last 
decade. Moreover, the approach of the Court in these two sets of cases is a study 
91. Evan Fox-Decent, “Th e Charter and Administrative Law: Cross-Fertilization in Public Law” 
in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery, 2008) 169 at 181.
92. Bruker, supra note 9.
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in contrasts. On challenges involving Quebec’s language policies, the Court did 
not divide on national lines. Rather, it spoke unanimously in its institutional 
voice with no apparent split between francophone and anglophone justices. One 
might argue that it worked to present a united front in order to protect its own 
legitimacy as well as that of the Charter. Its jurisprudence on reasonable accom-
modation, centred in Quebec, is markedly diff erent. Not only has the Court been 
divided, but its francophone judges have penned separate concurrences or dissents 
that map onto this cleavage, articulating theories of religion-state relations that 
echo the discourses of political elites in Quebec. Th is division poses a risk to the 
legitimacy of both the Charter and the Court itself against the backdrop of ongoing 
political controversy in Quebec.
Th e Supreme Court may be attempting to reach a consensus on reasonable 
accommodation across the Quebec-Canada divide out of an awareness of these 
risks. Th e decision in which it did so is SL, yet another Quebec case, this 
one concerning instruction on religion in public schools. For decades, public 
education in Quebec was organized on the basis of language and religious 
denomination. Th rough constitutional amendment, these arrangements were 
fi nally abolished in 1995 and replaced with a system organized solely on the basis 
of language. When schools were structured along religious lines, there was 
mandatory instruction on religion and morals. Th is instruction was eventually 
replaced with an Ethics and Religious Culture (ERC) Program that, on its 
face, provides education about diff erent religious traditions and ethics. Attendance 
is mandatory. 
In SL, Roman Catholic parents brought a constitutional challenge to the 
ERC Program, arguing that compulsory attendance interfered with their section 
2(a) rights to educate their children according to their religious values. In 
particular, they argued that the program imparted cultural relativism and that, 
as a consequence, they were entitled to reasonable accommodation in the form 
of an exemption from mandatory attendance. Th e Court unanimously dismissed 
the claim, with a majority judgment written by Justice Deschamps, holding that 
the parents had not discharged their burden of proving that the program had 
the eff ect of interfering with the parents’ ability to impart their religious values 
to their children. She did not reach the constitutional issue. As Justice LeBel 
pointed out in his concurrence, an evidentiary gap arose as a result of bringing 
the case against the ERC Program in the abstract instead of against its implemen-
tation in schools, which had not yet occurred. According to Justice LeBel, only 
then would it be possible to assess its potential impact on religious freedom. So, 
the ERC Program may reappear before the Court.
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When it does, the challenge may come not only from religious parents 
accusing the state of excessive secularism, but also from parents opposed to any 
teaching about religion in the public educational system, who would accuse the 
school of indirectly promoting religion by teaching students about it. Th is second 
set of parents could argue—drawing on the theory of religious neutrality set out 
by Justice LeBel in Lafontaine and Justice Deschamps in Bruker—that the public 
education system is under a duty to remain above the religious fray and to refrain 
from providing religious instruction at all, to protect the system from becoming 
a site of inter-faith confl ict and to protect the Court from legitimizing regressive 
religious practices. Whereas the religious parents in SL claimed that the ERC Program 
interfered with their freedom to religion, in a subsequent case a second set of parents 
could counter that the program interfered with their freedom from religion.
Th is case would place the court in the crossfi re between two competing 
constitutional claims, both framed in terms of section 2(a). Justice Deschamps 
appears to have anticipated this future dilemma and offered a response to 
pre-empt it. She reframed the theory of religious neutrality she had championed in 
Bruker, by rejecting “absolute neutrality”93 in favor of “a realistic and non-absolutist 
approach” that “shows respect for all postures toward religion, including that of 
having no religious beliefs whatsoever, while taking into account the competing 
constitutional rights of the individuals aff ected.”94 Th is modifi ed or softened 
doctrine of neutrality was necessary both because “[t]he societal changes that 
Canada has undergone since the middle of the last century have brought with 
them a new social philosophy that favours the recognition of minority rights,”95 
and because of “the multicultural reality of Canadian society.”96 
Th is is a sharp departure from the theory of the neutral state set out by 
Justice Bastarache in Amselem, Justice LeBel in Lafontaine, and Justice Deschamps 
in Bruker. It remains unclear whether they would have resolved those earlier 
cases diff erently on the basis of the new principle set out in SL. Th e opportunity 
to clarify these issues may come soon. The Parti Quebecois has formed the 
government in Quebec. Its election platform included a commitment to propose 
a Charter of Secularism that would defi ne Quebec as a secular state, presumably 
in order to condition the interpretation of undue hardship and constrict the 
scope of the duty to accommodate under the Quebec Charter. However, in what 
way the courts would interpret such amendments, and what bearing they would 
93. SL, supra note 12 at para 31.
94. Ibid at para 32.
95. Ibid at para 1.
96. Ibid at para 21.
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have on the interpretation of the Charter, are entirely diff erent questions. Th e 
Court’s modifi ed theory of neutrality suggests that these legislative initiatives may 
face constitutional diffi  culties. SL may have been an eff ort by the Court to forge 
a unifi ed position ahead of the constitutional battles to come.
